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Abstract
The rapid growth of computing, the Internet and
telecommunications systems have resulted in a broad
range of ways to communicate and access information. 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a Computer
Telephony Integration (CTI) solution that transports
voice traffic over a data network as an alternative to
the Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS). VoIP
products promise converged telecommunications and
data services that are cheaper, more versatile and
provide higher voice quality as compared to
traditional offerings. 
Although VoIP products are rapidly gaining market 
share with home users, uptake in the enterprise market 
has remained slow as a result of security and mobility
concerns. This paper addresses the issues surrounding
VoIP security and mobility through the integration of
robust security features into a lightweight VoIP
protocol that is tailored for mobile devices. A
theoretical approach is realized with the development
of a software prototype whose security and mobility
properties are analyzed.
1. Introduction
Telephone and computer systems are two
technologies that impact many aspects of our daily
lives. These technologies drive the world’s economy
and are central to the operation of virtually every
enterprise. However, the functionality of the telephone
system has not improved in the last 100 years.
Although handsets have become more sophisticated,
and operators are no longer required to connect calls in 
telephone exchanges, the basic operation remains the
same. Conversely, computing has grown significantly
throughout its lifespan.
Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) incorporates
computers and telephony systems [1]. Computer
features such as data handling, media processing and
graphical user interface are combined with telephone
features such as call handling and routing. Currently
CTI is predominantly used to drive software-based
Private Automatic Branch eXchanges (PABX).
However, CTI is heading toward the convergence of
voice and data services over a data network. Voice
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a CTI solution that is
commonly used as an alternative to the Plain Old
Telephone Service (POTS). Generally, VoIP refers to
the transport of voice traffic over a packet-switched
data network where hardware and software act as an
Internet transmission medium for telephone calls.
Packet switched networks route data packets on a hop-
by-hop basis. These networks have the following
properties:
- Telephone calls can be transmitted with little or no 
loss in functionality, reliability, or voice quality.
- Reduced telephony and infrastructure costs.
- Useful when there is limited or financially
prohibitive access to alternative telephony
networks.
- Increased line efficiency due to single lines being
dynamically shared by many packets over time. By 
contrast, circuit switched networks rely on
synchronous time division multiplexing where
links are often idle.
- Packet-switched networks can perform data-rate
conversions. Two nodes utilizing different data
rates can exchange data because each can connect
at its optimal data rate.
- When traffic becomes heavy on a circuit switched
network, additional calls are blocked. On a packet-
switched network, response time slows down
gradually without immediate service interruption.
- Priorities can be used on packet-switched networks 
to give precedence to more important traffic.
- New levels of integration are possible for voice
and a variety of data services.
VoIP has rapidly emerged as a popular alternative to 
existing telephony networks. Many sources [2, 3, 4, 5]
indicate that VoIP will grow from approximately
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100,000 US households in 2004 to more than 12
million by 2009. Although VoIP products are rapidly
gaining market share with home users who have reaped 
the benefits, uptake in the enterprise market has
remained slow as a result of security and mobility
concerns.
1.1 VoIP security
Corporate customers are generally more security
conscious. They require that potential new technologies 
are proven not to be a security risk. Most current VoIP 
offerings do not offer a practical security solution.
However, an important aspect behind the corporate
success of the VoIP technology is security. As VoIP
technology becomes more heavily integrated into the
workplace, so too do the opportunities for hackers.
Voice information during a VoIP call is generally
routed unsecured through data packets on a public
network. There is software that can capture, reconstruct 
and/or modify these sensitive voice conversations.
Standard VoIP implementations offer numerous
undesirable opportunities for creative hackers [6]:
- Eavesdropping and recording phone calls
- Tracking calls
- Stealing confidential information
- Modifying phone calls
- Making free phone calls
- Pranks / Practical jokes
- Board room bugging
- Sending spam (voice or email)
There are currently several competing VoIP
standards in the market (such as SIP [7], IAX [8] and
H.323 [9]), and very few practical security standards
available to secure them. Furthermore, many
enterprises that have adopted VoIP technology have
not been able to effectively secure these solutions as a
result of multi-vendor incompatibilities [10]. A
standard installation of VoIP using SIP, H.323 or IAX
protocols does not provide any kind of security for
voice traffic. To alleviate this, it is necessary to add
some form of protection, such as encryption, at the
transport or network layer. To facilitate secure mobile
VoIP, security must be addressed at each layer of the
network. We must secure the VoIP devices, segregate
the network, encrypt the traffic and introduce intrusion
detection systems [6]. By incorporating security at each 
level of the network, it makes successful attacks much
more difficult. Simply breaking one type of security
will not expose the entire network; it would require
multiple levels of protection to be compromised.
To allow multi-vendor solutions to interoperate it is
essential that such solutions are integrated into the
VoIP standard. Since VoIP protocols already use
negotiation options to determine call parameters (such
as codec), it is reasonable to suggest that security
parameters could be agreed on in a similar fashion.
1.2 Mobility
People are no longer desk-bound. Enterprises have
to consider the growing population of mobile users that 
would benefit from the next generation of Information
Technology and Telecommunication (IT&T) services.
As more sophisticated wireless devices emerge, the
demand for mobile two-way communication will rise
dramatically. Flexible, rich access to
telecommunications services is crucial in order to
achieve optimum performance. New technologies offer
innovative features that result in better ways of doing
business. It is essential to be 
To offer these VoIP services on mobile devices, it is 
necessary to consider the restrictions imposed by this
platform. Mobile devices typically have limited
processing power, memory, storage, network
connectivity and performance and poor battery life.
While this may not compete with desktop machines, the 
amount of processing power and other PDA features
have improved rapidly and could reasonably be
expected to continue to advance.
1.3 Existing solutions
There are various existing options to secure VoIP
traffic. Unfortunately, no solutions are offered that
provide suitable security characteristics while running
on a mobile device. The following gives a brief
summary of the existing solutions in the areas
surrounding secure VoIP communication.
1.3.1 Secure real-time transport protocol. The
Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) was
developed for securing the media stream of VoIP
protocols (such as H323 and SIP) that rely on the Real-
time Transport Protocol (RTP). However, the protocol
is not designed for mobile use. Solutions surrounding
the RTP protocol suffer NAT traversal problems which 
create serious issues for mobile users.
1.3.2 IP security / Virtual private networks. Another
option to secure media streams is to pass all traffic
through an existing VPN. This approach has several
problems. The most obvious is that a Security
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Association must exist between the originating and
destination networks. 
This paper details the research and development of a 
secure VoIP client that is geared toward mobile
devices. In particular, the key outcomes are the
utilisation of a lightweight VoIP protocol and proven
encryption techniques to implement a fully functioning, 
lightweight VoIP peer client. Special considerations are 
given to the characteristics and operation environment
of mobile devices. 
Section 2 outlines the solution background. Section
3 describes the design and implementation of the
prototype solution. Section 4 provides performance
analysis and evaluation discussion. Section 5 concludes 
the paper.
2. Solution background
There have been many attempts to provide secure
services for the major VoIP protocols [6, 11, 12, 13].
Unfortunately, these systems typically suffer from the
following problems:
- Complicated to deploy and maintain
- Rely on proprietary and/or incompatible solutions
- Require an existing Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) and/or other resources
- Experience Significant routing problems when
passing through NAT
2.1 Inter-asterisk eXchange (IAX)
The Inter-Asterisk Exchange protocol (IAX) is a
new protocol that has recently been developed in
conjunction with the open-source Private Automatic
Branch eXchange (PABX) known as Asterisk [8][14].
This protocol was created as an alternative signalling
protocol to SIP and H.323 [8]. It is currently rapidly
gaining market-share in the VoIP market and shows
considerable promise in the near future. The primary
features of IAX are [15]:
- Highly optimised for the existing requirements of 
VoIP.
- Superior efficiency to H.323 and SIP when passing 
VoIP traffic [16]
- Minimised efficient bandwidth utilisation for both 
signalling and media transfers [16].
- Native support for Network Address Translation 
(NAT) technology. Able to share a single port 
number, and transfer all data over a well known 
UDP port.
- Single protocol without the requirement of a 
separate media transfer protocol. All call signalling 
information, sequencing, and timing information is 
included in the transferred IAX frames. 
- Written in a lightweight fashion. 
- Designed to be easily implemented [15]
- Can be used with any type of streaming media data 
(including video).
2.1.1 IAX security. IAX has been demonstrated to
provide significantly greater efficiencies than SIP or
H.323 when running unsecured [16], its performance in 
a secure environment is investigated here. If IAX can
provide the same comparative levels of efficiency it is
an ideal protocol for deployments with NAT
environments and mobile users. 
2.2 VoIP quality considerations
The parameters that a user would normally associate 
with their determination of call quality are known as
Quality of Service characteristics. When voice data is
traversing a packet-switched network, the handling of
the traffic will achieve certain operational performance 
levels under various demand levels. Inter-arrival delay, 
jitter and packet loss are used as intrinsic QoS
measures [17].
2.3 Audio codec
All VoIP technologies rely on a codec to transform
analogue signals into digital voice packets. The choice
of codec is a trade-off between voice quality,
processing power and bandwidth requirements. A
selection of commonly used VoIP codecs is given in


















Free / closed 
source
AMR 8 4.75-12.2 Yes No Yes Proprietary
G.729 8 8 No No Yes Proprietary
GSM 8 13 No No No Patented
G.723.1 8 5.3 6.3 No No Yes Proprietary
G.728 8 16 No No No Proprietary
Table 1. Codec feature comparison chart
2.4 Encryption algorithms
In order to provide secure transmission of data, it is
necessary to offer confidentiality and authentication. In
2110
other words, data must be valid and should not be
available nor disclosed to unauthorized parties. 
In order to support different codecs, the encryption
algorithm must be able to support variable length data
payloads where the amount of data per frame is likely
to be short but send at a high frequency (approximately
30-100 bytes 50 times per second).
As the data payload is relatively small, it would be
advantageous to use an encryption method that will not 
increase the size of the data to be sent. Any small
increases in size will add significant overhead to the
transmission.
2.5 Mobile clients
A goal of this paper is to produce a secure VoIP
client that can be run in a mobile device such as a PDA 
or smart phone. As there are currently no mobile open-
source IAX clients suitable for testing, evaluations of
our solution can be performed on a laptop. The table
below compares a low end laptop with a high end PDA 
[11].
Device Name: IBM X30 
Laptop
Dell Axim X51 
PDA [14]
CPU Manufacturer: Intel Intel
CPU Speed: 800 MHz 624 MHz
Available RAM: 512 MB 64 MB
MIPS Rating: 2142 800
Comparative MIPS: 1.0 0.37
Table 2. CPU comparison of laptop and PDA
Although using MIPS (Million Instructions per
Second) does not take into account the different
instruction sets between CPUs, it is often used to give
an approximate performance rating. Based on a simple
MIPS comparison, a Dell Axim X51 PDA is able to
perform 37% of the integer operations capacity of an
IBM X30 laptop.
3. Design and implementation
To demonstrate the proposed modifications to the
IAX protocol, it was necessary to add these features to
a VoIP client. An open source client was selected, the
code examined, and an injection point to add the
security code was identified. The tools and
methodology to accomplish this are described below.
3.1 Kiax VoIP client
Kiax [19] is an open source soft-phone designed to
exclusively utilise IAX. Like many other open source
IAX clients, Kiax relies on the freely available “libiax” 
library to take care of the low level network functions.
This library was constructed by the makers of Asterisk, 
and is commonly used by open source IAX clients. The 
code modifications necessary to support encryption
were mostly required within libiax.
3.2 Cryptlib
Cryptlib is an powerful, general purpose open-
source cryptography package designed to provide
security services to applications. Its main purpose is to
provide cryptography functions that can be integrated
into applications. The design of Cryptlib is based on a
layered structure that can provide different levels of
control to the user. Using Cryptlib, it was possible to
experiment with a variety of different encryption
methods to assess their impact on performance. A
complete architecture diagram is given in Figure 1,
below [20]:
Figure 1. Cryptlib Architecture Diagram
3.3 Solution architecture
The block diagrams below give a basic description
of the structure of the kiax software layers.
Figure 2. Standard Kiax architecture
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Figure 2, above, demonstrates the architecture of the 
original version of Kiax. Kiax provides a GUI interface 
to the user, which communicates the settings and
preferences to the Kiax program code. The low level
IAX protocol program code is provided in the form of
a standard library known as libiax.c. This library
package is also responsible for encoding and
transporting the audio data captured from users.
The modified version of Kiax adds another layer of
processing to the audio stream. After the voice data has 
been encoded via the audio codec, it is intercepted and 
encrypted before being sent across the network. At the
receiver’s side, the audio is decrypted, and passed back 
through the normal Kiax processing stack.
Figure 3. Modified Kiax Architecture Diagram
4. Results and evaluation
Testing was carried out to assess the impact of
security modifications to the Kiax program. After
configuring the Local Area Network and the client
machines, calls were placed and the data was collected. 
All tests were repeatable and provided very consistent
data. A summary of the results is given below:
VoIP Client: Kiax Kiax Kiax Kiax
Encryption: None IDEA/CBC IDEA/CFB RC4
Min. CPU Use: 5.812% 17.818 % 16.132 % 17.635 %
Max. CPU Use: 10.020% 28.629 % 26.226 % 27.756 %
Avg. CPU Use: 7.935% 24.158 % 22.756 % 23.090 %
Max. Bandwidth: 1.75 kB/s 2.08 kB/s 1.75 kB/s 1.75 kB/s
Delay Range: 16-58 ms 16-58 ms 16-58 ms 16-58 ms
Jitter Range: 26-28 ms 26-28 ms 26-28 ms 26-28 ms
Table 3. LAN test results 1
VoIP Client: Kiax Kiax Firefly
Encryption: AES/CBC AES/CFB None
Min. CPU Use: 17.818 % 14.629 % 8.719 %
Max. CPU Use: 27.427 % 27.227 % 13.123 %
Avg. CPU Use: 23.447 % 22.592 % 11.364 %
Max. Bandwidth: 2.48 kB/s 1.75 kB/s 1.69 kB/s
Delay Range: 16-58 ms 16-58 ms 2-3 ms
Jitter Range: 26-28 ms 26-28 ms 2-4 ms
Table 4. LAN test results 2
Using Kiax with no encryption, the average
processor utilisation is 7.9%, and the bandwidth used
approximately 1.75 kilobytes per second. This provides 
a baseline for Kiax’s performance.
Idea - In CBC mode, the quality of the call remained 
similar to using no encryption, however the bandwidth
use increased. This is to be expected, as the data size
increased from 33 to 40 bytes. When using IDEA in
CFB mode, although the bandwidth was identical to the 
baseline, the call quality was more frequently
interrupted by audio drop outs. 
AES - In CBC mode, AES had slightly lower CPU
usage as compared to IDEA/CBC, and can be
attributed to the AES algorithm being more efficient.
This method used the highest amount of bandwidth,
adding approximately 0.7kB p/s. The bandwidth
increase is larger for AES than IDEA, since the AES
algorithm has a block size of 128 bits compared to
IDEA using only 64. AES using CFB produced the
lowest average CPU utilisation of the encryption
methods tested, and did not require additional
bandwidth.
RC4 - The RC4 algorithm performed slightly worse
than AES/CFB. This is surprising, considering that it is 
natively a stream cipher. 
Overall, the results of both call quality and
processor usage are similar for the different encryption
algorithms. However, AES in CFB mode should be
considered as the preferred method, as it gives the
lowest average CPU load, does not add any additional
bandwidth requirements and introduces a minimum
number of problems in the audio stream.
5. Conclusion
VoIP products promise converged
telecommunications and data services that are cheaper,
more versatile and provide higher voice quality as
compared to traditional offerings. Although VoIP
products are rapidly gaining market share with home
users, uptake in the enterprise market has remained
slow as a result of security and mobility concerns. This 
paper addresses these security and mobility issues
through the integration of robust security features into a 
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lightweight VoIP protocol that is tailored for mobile
devices. A theoretical approach is realised with the
development of a software prototype whose security
and mobility properties are analysed. The prototype
that was created to assess this approach had the
following properties:
- Provided a choice of 5 different encryption 
methods
- Successfully traverses NAT
- Simulated key exchange by the use of pre-shared
session key
- Strong security
- No change to bandwidth requirements
- Relatively low processor requirements
Kiax was selected as the basis for the proposed
system as it was freely available under an open-source
license. Although it provides a valid base for
evaluating different encryption methods, the IAX
library it provides does not give optimal performance
or call quality. Despite the limitations of the client, the
results of the performance testing clearly demonstrate
the feasibility of this approach.
In the future we intend to extend this research with
the use of optimised clients and encryption libraries
and test these solutions on mobile devices and mobile
device emulators.
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